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Standing Issues in Tax Litigation
By Steve R. Johnson*

I

ssues as to standing have appeared in
tax cases for generations, but the
frequency of their appearance has
increased markedly in recent years. In
2014 alone, nearly a dozen opinions in
high-profile tax cases plumbed the
depths of standing doctrine.
This article summarizes the principal
rules governing standing. Then it
illustrates standing issues in tax
litigation, in both traditional Code and
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
contexts.

Standing in Brief
“[T]he doctrine of standing serves
to identify those disputes which
are appropriately resolved through
the judicial process.” Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
It reflects the intuition that “[n]ot
every disagreement merits a lawsuit.”
Scenic America, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transportation, 983 F. Supp. 2d 170,
175 (D.D.C. 2013).
Traditionally, standing is thought to
have both constitutional and prudential
dimensions. The constitutional
dimension emanates from Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1, which limits the
scope of the federal judicial power
to “Cases [or] Controversies.” The
“irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing” entails three aspects. The
plaintiff must show that (1) she suffered
a legally cognizable injury, (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the conduct
complained of, and (3) a favorable
decision would likely redress the injury.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992).
Prudential standing embodies
“judicially self-imposed limits on
the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751

(1984). Although “not exhaustively
defined,” it was said to reflect at least
three broad principles: “the general
prohibition on a litigant’s raising another
person’s legal rights, the rule barring
adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint
fall within the zone of interest protected
by the law invoked.” Elk Grove Unified
School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12
(2004) (quoting id.).
However, federal courts generally
are obligated to hear and decide cases
within their jurisdiction. E.g., Sprint
Commun., Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct.
584, 591 (2013). Prudential standing
(and other doctrines like ripeness and
mootness) are “in some tension with”
that obligation. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)(seeming to
convert “zone of interest” analysis from
part of standing to part of statutory
interpretation). This “has placed the
continuing vitality of the prudential
aspects of standing … in doubt.”
Kentucky v. United States ex rel. Hagel,
759 F.3d 588, 596 n.3 (6th Cir. 2014).
The Tax Court “exercises a portion
of the judicial power of the United
States.” Freytag v. Commissioner, 501
U.S. 868, 891 (1991). Accordingly,
“those elements that define and restrict
judicial power, such as ‘standing,’ are
necessarily applicable to [Tax Court]
proceedings.” Anthony v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 367, 371 (1976).

Standing in Traditional
Code Cases
“Traditional” cases involve one or
a few taxpayers in forms of action
prescribed by the Code, including
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deficiency actions, refund suits, and
eligibility suits under provisions such
as sections 7428 and 7476 to 7479.
In cases such as these, indeed in most
cases, a plaintiff’s “standing to seek
review of administrative action is selfevident.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d
895, 899–900 (D.C. Cir. 2002). For
discussion of “self-evident standing,”
see American Ins. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of
HUD, 2014 WL 5802283, at *6 (D.D.C.
Nov. 7, 2014).
Nonetheless, standing issues can
arise even in traditional tax cases. For
example, the Service sought to use
evidence obtained from a search as
to Kersting to support its adjustment
against the Dixons. The Dixons alleged
that the Service had obtained the
evidence from Kersting illegally. The Tax
Court, noting that one cannot assert the
rights of others, held that the Dixons
lacked standing to assert Kersting’s
Fourth Amendment rights. Dixon v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 237 (1988).
However, standing often has been
invoked in questionable situations. For
instance, the courts have relied on lack
of standing to hold that a taxpayer may
not (1) sue in his individual capacity
when the Service issued a notice to him
as possessor of unclaimed cash under
section 6867, Matut v. Commissioner,
84 T.C. 803, 808 n.7 (1985); (2)
assert that the U.S. is violating treaties
and committing war crimes as a basis
for not paying her income taxes, e.g.,
Scheide v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 455
(1975); (3) defend claimed charitable
contribution deductions by arguing that
section 170 is unconstitutional, Kessler
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1285, 1293
(1986); or (4) as the nonrequesting
spouse, argue about the amount of
tax owed (pre-relief) by the spouse
claiming relief under section 6015,
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e.g., Estate of Ravetti v. Commissioner,
37 F.3d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994).
The taxpayers lost and should have
lost on these issues. However, under
Lexmark, supra, statutory interpretation
(the Code sections at issue did not
render consequential the contentions
the taxpayers were offering) offers a
better ground for rejecting the taxpayers’
positions than standing does.

Standing in APA Cases
Although traditional Code forms
of action far predominate, increasing
numbers of litigants base their suits
against Treasury or the Service on the
APA. Under the APA, redress is available
to anyone “suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 702. The reviewing court may, among
other remedies, compel agency action
wrongly withheld or set aside agency
action that is arbitrary and capricious,
in excess of statutory authority, or
procedurally improper. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1) & (2).
An APA challenge may be brought
via “any applicable form of legal action”
unless a special review scheme is
mandated. 5 U.S.C. § 703. Thus, if a
deficiency, refund, or other Code-based
form of action is available, it must be
used instead of suit under the APA.
Plaintiffs also must overcome other
hurdles in order to proceed under the
APA. In addition to standing, these
hurdles include such issues as ripeness,
exhaustion of remedies, and the AntiInjunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421.
APA tax suits often pit powerful
adversaries against each other: the
government defending the regulation or
other position against attacks by wellorganized and well-funded industrial or
ideological interests, often fronted by
one or several individual plaintiffs. The
government typically argues that the
plaintiffs lack standing to seek some
or all of the relief sought. Some recent
examples are noted below.
In Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, 2014 WL 114519

(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2014), two bankers
associations challenged Treasury
regulations requiring reporting of
information on U.S. accounts of foreign
depositors, which information the
Service would share with the revenue
authorities of depositors’ home countries.
The standing issue involved the doctrine
of organizational or representational
standing, under which an organization
may litigate on behalf of its members
under certain conditions. Noting that
banks in the associations were directly
affected by the regulations, the court
found that standing was self-evident,
without the need for detailed affidavits.
In another recent representational
standing case, to fill the gap felt by
invalidation of its mandatory program in
Loving v. IRS, 742 F. 3d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
2014), the Service launched an effort to
encourage unenrolled return preparers
to “voluntarily” enhance their skills. The
AICPA sued to invalidate this effort. The
court granted the government’s motion
to dismiss. One of the elements for
representative standing is that at least
one of the organization’s members would
have standing to sue in its own right.
This element was not met. The AICPA
has no members who are unenrolled
preparers, and the AICPA’s attempts
to connect their members to the
voluntary program were too speculative,
conclusory, or unrelated. American Inst.
of Certified Pub. Accountants v. IRS,
2014 WL 5585334 (D.D.C. Oct. 27,
2014).
Atheist organizations and associated
individuals brought suits seeking
invalidation of the section 107 parsonage
allowance. In 2013, the Western District
of Wisconsin found that the plaintiffs
had standing to challenge section 107(2)
but not section 107(1). On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit vacated the decision
on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked
standing. Freedom from Religion Found.,
Inc. v. Lew, 2014 WL 5861632 (7th
Cir. Nov. 13, 2014), rev’g 983 F. Supp.
2d 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2013). Another
2014 decision also rejected, on standing
grounds, a challenge to the parsonage

allowance. American Atheists, Inc. v.
Shulman, 2014 WL 2047911 (E.D. Ky.
May 19, 2014).
The section 107 cases are interesting
in at least two respects. First, in
general, one does not have standing
simply as a taxpayer; this interest is
insufficiently particularized. There
is a narrow exception under Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The cases
explored and rejected the applicability
of that exception.
Second, the injury claimed by the
atheists was that they were barred
from receiving the benefit that church
officiants were getting. But the atheists
never applied to the Service to receive
those benefits. The opinions differed
sharply as to how likely the Service
would have been to approve the
applications had they been made.
Whether the point is formalistic or not,
the atheists’ failure to apply counted
heavily against them. The causation
aspect of constitutional standing is
not met when the harm results from
the plaintiffs’ own voluntary action
or inaction.
Despite the upholding of the shared
responsibility payment in National
Fed. of Independent Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), challenges to
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) remain
plentiful—and produce many standing
issues. Liberty University and others
challenged the validity of the ACA’s
employer mandate. The government
moved to dismiss for lack of standing
on the ground that the plaintiffs face no
actual or imminent injury. The motion
failed. Liberty had the burden of proving
standing, but the required showing
may change as the case progresses.
To defeat a motion to dismiss, Liberty
“need not prove that the employer
mandate will increase its costs of
providing health coverage; it need only
plausibly allege that it will.” Liberty
Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 90 (4th
Cir. 2013)(emphasis in original), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 683 (2013).
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Several cases have challenged the
validity of regulation section
1.36B-2(a)(1), which extends the ACA’s
premium assistance credit to persons
enrolled in federal exchanges set up
in states which declined to establish
medical insurance exchanges. The courts
typically have held that the governmental
and private plaintiffs have standing.

Even though part of their motivation is
ideological, the plaintiffs face additional
expenses under the ACA, which suffices
to establish standing. E.g., Halbig v.
Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
see also King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358
(4th Cir. 2014); Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt
v. Burwell, 2014 WL 4854543 (E.D.
Okla. Sept. 30, 2014).
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Conclusion
Standing issues are not the “meat
and potatoes” of federal tax litigation.
However, they are of growing
importance. The able tax attorney
should have at least working knowledge
of the intricacies of standing doctrine. 

